In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the L p -norm (for a …xed p 1). When the policy space is multi-dimensional and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, any quasi-transitive welfare function must be oligarchic. As a corollary we obtain that for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.
welfare function to satisfy weak Pareto (if all individuals strictly prefer one alternative to another, then so does society), independence of irrelevant alternatives (the social ranking of two alternatives only depends on the individual rankings of these alternatives), and non-dictatorship when the preference domain is unrestricted. When the set of alternatives is structured, the assumption of unrestricted domain might be unreasonable. One important exception of this kind are spatial environments. In spatial environments, alternatives are points in a multi-dimensional space of issue positions and individual preferences are continuous, quasi-concave, and have bliss points.
1
There is one well-known spatial environment in which Arrow's requirements are consistent. If the number of voters is odd and the policy space is one-dimensional, then simple majority voting is transitive and satis…es weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and anonymity (Black ,1948; Arrow, 1951 Arrow, , 1963 . Simple majority voting is an example of an Arrovian welfare function belonging to the following class: if the number of voters is n, …x n 1 preferences of additional constant voters, and apply to each pro…le of individual preferences majority voting over this pro…le and the n 1 …xed voters.
2;3
If the policy space is multi-dimensional and unbounded, and preferences are Euclidean, then Arrow's requirements are inconsistent (Border, 1984) . Other proofs show that the domain of Euclidean preferences is "saturating" and apply a result due to Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) to deduce Arrow's impossibility (Le Breton and Weymark, 1996 , 2000 Campbell, 1993 4 ). However, the proofs of 1 An excellent review of the literature is Le Breton and Weymark (2000) . 2 Ehlers and Storcken (2002) provide a characterization of all welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. 3 For …nite sets of alternatives Vohra (2003,2006) introduce an integer linear programming formulation of anonymous and transitive Arrovian social welfare functions (ruling out social indi¤erences). They show that any such welfare function is monotonic if and only if it is simple majority voting with n + 1 …xed voters for any domain with no Condorcet triples and which contains an ordering and its inversion. 4 Campbell (1993) drops weak Pareto and imposes instead continuity of social preference.
these results rely importantly on the unboundedness of the policy space. As far as we know, Arrow's theorem has not been established in spatial environments when the set of alternatives is compact and convex. It is natural to assume that a government faces budget constraints and therefore the set of policy alternatives becomes bounded.
We derive Arrow's theorem in such spatial environments. If individual preferences are measure distances according to a given L p -norm and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, then weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent, i.e. again decisiveness of a coalition spreads from one pair of alternatives to all pairs of alternatives and dictatorship results.
Instead of showing Arrow's theorem directly, we will establish a stronger result. Gibbard (1969) and Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972) require social orderings only to be quasi-transitive and show that for a …nite set of alternatives with an unrestricted domain any quasi-transitive welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be oligarchic. This means that there exists a non-empty coalition S (called the oligarchy) such that an alternative a is socially strictly preferred to another alternative b if and only if all members of the oligarchy agree that a is strictly preferred to b. Our main result shows the following: if individual preferences individual preferences are measure distance according to the L p -norm and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, then any quasi-transitive welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be oligarchic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our notation and the main de…nitions. In Section 3 we state that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the policy space is compact, convex, and at least two-dimensional. In Section 4 we introduce oligarchic welfare functions and give our main result: any quasi-transitive welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be oligarchic. Section 5 contains the proof of our main result. Section 6 concludes.
Notation and De…nitions
We use the same terminology and notation as Le Breton and Weymark (2000) . Let
R denote the set of real numbers and R m denote the m-dimensional Euclidean space.
Let N f1; 2; : : : ; ng denote a …nite set of agents with n 2, and let A R m denote a set of alternatives. Each point in R m identi…es the changes in the level of m di¤erent policies, for example public spending on police, health care, and so on.
Let W denote the set of all complete, re ‡exive, and transitive relations over A. An element of W is called a weak ordering over A. Let Q denote the set of all complete, re ‡exive, and quasi-transitive relations over A. An element of Q is called a quasi ordering over A.
Given R i 2 Q, the corresponding strict relation, P i , and the indi¤erence relation, 
is quasi-transitive for all R 2 R N welfare function f is said to be quasi-transitive.
We call a welfare function f transitive if it is a mapping f :
Note that social orderings need not belong to the individual preference domain R. Other authors impose the restriction that any social ordering belongs to each individual's preference domain (for example, Peters, van der Stel, and Storcken, 1992, and Bossert and Weymark, 1993 ).
Arrow's requirements are as follows. The …rst axiom says that if all agents strictly prefer a to b, then a should also be socially strictly preferred to b.
Weak Pareto: For all R 2 R N and all a; b 2 A, if for all i 2 N , aP i b, then :bf (R)a.
Given R 2 R N , X A, and j 2 N , let R j jX denote the restriction of R j to X, and RjX (R i jX) i2N . The second axiom says that the social ordering of two alternatives only depends on the pro…le of individual preferences restricted to these two alternatives.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all R; R 2 R N and all a; b 2 A,
A welfare function is Arrovian if it satis…es weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. A welfare function is dictatorial if there exists some agent such that for each pro…le the social strict preference relation respects the strict preference relation of this agent.
Non-Dictatorship: There exists no i 2 N such that for all R 2 R N and all
Arrow's Theorem shows that for transitive welfare functions, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are incompatible if the set of alternatives is …nite and the individual preference domain R contains all strict orderings over the set of alternatives.
Arrow' s Theorem for Multi-Dimensional Policy Spaces
Throughout we consider environments where the set of alternatives is multi-dimensional and connected with respect to the standard topology on R m . Let A R m be a set of alternatives such that the relative interior of A in R m is non-empty. A preference
Note that p remains …xed throughout.
For the special case of A = R m and the Euclidean norm, Border (1984) and Le Breton and Weymark (1996) establish Arrow's theorem for transitive welfare func- Weymark (2000, 2002) show Arrow's theorem for transitive welfare functions. However, all these results rely importantly on the unboundedness of the set of alternatives. In real life, policy makers face budget constraints and these results do not apply.
A corollary of our main result will be the following theorem: Arrow's requirements are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty and connected interior and it is contained in the closure of its interior (i.e. its boundary has no "tails"). In particular, Theorem 1 yields Arrow's theorem for compact and convex sets of policy alternatives with non-empty interior.
If the interior of the set of alternatives is non-empty and not connected, then an Arrovian social welfare function may not be dictatorial.
, and for all a 2 A 1 and all b 2 A 2 , f (R)jfa; bg = R 1 jfa; bg. Then f is a transitive Arrovian welfare function satisfying non-dictatorship. Now it is easy to check that f is a transitive welfare function satisfying weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship.
Oligarchies
Above any welfare function satis…ed transitivity. Below social orderings are only required to be quasi-transitive. In order to formulate our main result, we need to introduce the notion of decisiveness and oligarchies.
Given ; 6 = S N and a; b 2 A, we say that S is decisive over "a preferred to b"if for all R 2 R N p we have :bf (R)a whenever aP i b for all i 2 S. Let D(a; b) denote the set of all coalitions that are decisive over "a preferred to b". We say that S blocks "a preferred to b"if for all R 2 R N p we have bf (R)a whenever bP i a for all i 2 S. Let B(a; b) denote the set of all coalitions that block "a preferred to b".
Let f be a welfare function and S be a non-empty coalition. Then f is called We show Theorem 2 in the next section. Theorem 1 will be an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let f be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives on the domain R N p . Given X A, let f X denote the restriction of f to the set of alternatives X. Formally, for all R 2 R
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives from f .
We introduce additional notation. Let a; b; c 2 R m be three distinct alternatives.
Let The following is a direct consequence of Blair and Pollack (1979) .
Lemma 2 Let a; b; c 2 A be such that fa; b; cg is a free triple in the domain R p .
Then f fa;b;cg is oligarchic.
Now if fa; b; cg is a free triple in the domain R p , then let ; 6 = S fa;b;cg N be such that f fa;b;cg is oligarchic with oligarchy S fa;b;cg . Note that any oligarchy is uniquely determined, i.e. if f fa;b;cg is oligarchic with oligarchies S 1 and S 2 , then S 1 = S 2 .
The next lemma establishes that f is oligarchic on any open ball, which is contained in the interior of A.
Lemma 3 Lemma 4 There exists a non-empty S N such that for all a 2 int(A) and all b 2 A, with a 6 = b, f fa;bg is oligarchic with oligarchy S.
Proof. First we proof the following: for all a 2 int(A), there exists a non-empty S a N such that for all b 2 Anfag, f fa;bg is oligarchic with oligarchy S a .
In order to proof this claim, let a 2 int ( In order to …nish the proof of Lemma 4, let a; a 0 2 int(A). By (1), it is su¢ cient to show S a = S a 0 . If a = a 0 , then this is trivial. If a 6 = a 0 ;then by (1) we have f fa;a 0 g is oligarchic with oligarchies S a and S a 0 . Therefore, S a = S a 0 , the desired conclusion.
Theorem 2 will follow from our …nal lemma.
Lemma 5 There exists a non-empty S N such that f is oligarchic with oligarchy
S.
Proof. By Lemma 4, f intA is oligarchic, say with oligarchy S. Let a; b 2 An int(A). Thus, for some t 2 [0; 1] (t) 2 H(a; b). Since is continuous, t 1 minft 2 [0; 1] :
Next we show space(adb) \ A 6 = ;. 
Conclusion
As the careful reader may have observed, for the proof of Theorem 2 it is crucial that for any hyperbox box(d; u), any triple of its corner points is free in the domain R p . for non-colinear a, b, and c in R 2 .
